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Abstract 
This essay seeks to shed new light on the intricate course of U.S.-
Moroccan relations following the landing of American troops on the 
Atlantic coasts of Morocco. The Anfa Conference and Sultan Mohamed 
V’s dinner meeting with President Roosevelt marked an important stage in 
the process of Moroccan struggle for independence. Roosevelt’s personal 
interest in the Moroccan situation may have accentuated the 
inconsistencies in U.S. foreign policy in the 1940s regarding the French 
colonial empire and confronted its fundamental idealism with the 
exigencies of pragmatic politics. The vicissitudes of the war and America’s 
deep commitment to its French ally as well as its efforts to contain the 
spreading influence of communism across North Africa compelled the 
American administration to generally adopt an ambivalent position vis-à-
vis Moroccan nationalist movement in its fierce pursuit for independence.  
 
Keywords: U.S.-Moroccan relations, Anfa Conference, FDR, Sultan 
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Introduction 
Accounts of Moroccan-American relations have often emphasized the 
fortuitous origins of these relations especially in an era marked by limited 
diplomatic contact with the burgeoning United States and even by acts of hostility 
toward it from the so-called Barbary States (Roberts & Roberts, 2008). What is 
more intriguing is the remarkable longevity of these relations despite the lack of 
extensive commercial and political interests between the two nations that could 
justify such enduring mutual esteem. Historical annals bear witness to a steady and 
peaceful course of relations devoid of any dramatic incidents. For over a century, 
and aside from the peace treaties of 1786 and 1836, U.S. consuls established in 
Tangier had little to report to their home authorities. The Perdicaris affair of 1904 
was a peculiar diplomatic oddity that gained momentary attention in the American 
press mostly as a campaign slogan (Davis, 1941, p. 517; Hall, 1971, p. 341). 
Nevertheless, the enduring value of U.S.-Moroccan relations today is largely 
the fruit of this benign legacy. It has become an established custom for government 
officials of both countries to indulge in a graceful narrative of how Morocco was 
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the first country to recognize the independence of the nascent republic and how 
Sultan Mawlay Suleiman made a generous gift of a house in the old medina of 
Tangier to Consul John Mullowny in 1822. Although it has ceased to have an 
official character, the house is the seat of the American Legation and is still 
cherished as the oldest American public property outside the U.S. In recent decades, 
Morocco has been viewed in U.S. media and in the official circles as a strategic ally 
in the MENA region and a reliable partner in the global war on terrorism. Besides 
close security cooperation, Morocco has concluded important military and trade 
agreements with the United States and benefited from various aid programs.  
Within the Moroccan context, historians have expounded on the decisive 
intervention of the United States during World War II and its consequent impact on 
the colonial regimes in North Africa. The landing of American troops on the 
Moroccan coasts as part of Operation Torch in November 1942 inaugurated a new 
phase in modern Moroccan history and helped raise political consciousness among 
the Moroccan elite (Baida, 2014). U.S.-Moroccan relations, in particular, gained 
momentum following the historic meeting between President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
(FDR) and Sultan Mohamed Ben Youssef during the Anfa Conference held in 
January 1943. No record has provided more vivid a description of the long and 
friendly conversation between the two leaders than the account offered by FDR’s 
own son, Elliot in his memoir titled As He Saw it (1946). Elliot Roosevelt (1946), 
who served as the president’s military attaché, noted that the dinner meeting was 
attended by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill who, seated on the left side 
of the president, “grew more and more disgruntled” as the conversation between 
FDR and the sultan dwelt on the “wealth of natural resources” in the country (p. 
110). The Sultan made no secret of his wish to engage American support in 
promoting “modern educational and health standards” (Roosevelt, 1946, p. 110) in 
Morocco and shaping the future development plans of the country. On the political 
plane, the sultan, it is stated, was particularly elated by FDR’s remark that “the 
postwar scene and the pre-war scene would, of course, differ sharply, especially as 
they related to the colonial question” (Roosevelt, 1946, p. 111). 
Elliot’s account makes frequent reference to Churchill’s sense of malaise as he 
listened to the cordial exchange between the sultan and the president. Evidently, 
Roosevelt’s critical views of European colonial empires were both vexing and 
alarming. In the following years, the substance of Roosevelt’s conversation with the 
sultan became the object of ongoing speculation (Sangmuah 1992; Stenner, 2014). 
In their correspondence, U.S. officials often denied the claim that FDR promised to 
support Moroccan ambitions for independence. This essay looks at the broader 
context of U.S.-Moroccan relations in the years that followed the Anfa Conference 
and focuses on the impact of that single dinner meeting on the political evolution of 
Morocco toward independence. While they did not amount to a formal declaration, 
the progressive views voiced by FDR over the meeting emboldened the sultan and 
nationalist leaders to embrace a militant agenda and oppose French colonial 
policies. For the Moroccan nationalists who took to heart the liberal principles 
professed in the Atlantic charter and the four freedoms announced in FDR’s speech 
in 1941, the old status quo guaranteed by the Protectorate Treaty of 1912 was 
inadmissible. France, after all, was in no measure to honor the terms of the treaty. 
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Politically divided, it depended on the Allies for help to liberate its own occupied 
territories. A year after the Anfa meeting, Moroccan nationalist leaders would 
present a manifesto calling for independence under the sultan. This triggered a new 
phase of conflict with the French colonial authorities and plunged the country into 
a vicious cycle of violence and repression.  
 
Roosevelt and the Sultan 
The specific nature of FDR’s pledges to the sultan has stirred a continuing 
controversy among historians. Given that no official record of the dinner meeting 
exists other than the personal accounts of some of those who were present notably 
FDR’s son, Elliot, and the Crown Prince Hassan, the exchange between the sultan 
and the president became a subject of interpretation and contestation. The gist of 
this controversy centered on the political significance of the meeting and its 
powerful impact on the nationalist agenda in Morocco in the following years. 
Several historians have emphasized the relentless efforts of the sultan and 
nationalist leaders to enlist American official support for independence and to 
engage the figure of FDR in their propaganda war against the French (Rivlin, 1982). 
A recent historian has even argued that Moroccan nationalists invented a 
“Roosevelt’s myth” “to legitimize their claims in the eyes of Western diplomats and 
politicians” (Stenner, 2014, p. 526). The problem with this American-centered 
narrative is that it constructs a rigid and quite reductive view of Moroccan anti-
colonial struggle, which was a multi-faceted and a dynamic process. More 
importantly, it makes light of Roosevelt’s political convictions vis-a-vis French 
colonial regime in North Africa. FDR’s attitude not only was the outcome of 
personal sympathy with an ambitious young sultan, but also rested on a firm belief 
in the right of subject peoples to govern themselves and take advantage of their own 
natural resources.  
There is a substantial amount of archival information that is now available 
involving FDR’s subsequent correspondence with the sultan testifying to his keen 
interest in the future status of Morocco. What transpires from these letters is that 
FDR’s sympathetic views were not fully shared by the members of his own 
government for whom the ongoing war-time conditions and the necessity of 
safeguarding the interests of such a strategic ally as France formed a more urgent 
priority. However, it is important to keep in mind that for the sultan and the 
nationalists, FDR and the United States represented a positive force of change that 
opened a new frontier for political action against a protecting nation, which seemed 
to have betrayed its promises and lost its credibility.  
FDR’s letters to the sultan and his exchanged memos with Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull and other officials relating to the Moroccan situation are now 
accessible online from the State Department.1 There are numerous records available 
at the National Archives website on the Anfa Conference. The Morocco file consists 
 
1 “Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration (1933–1945).” Retrieved from 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/roosevelt-fd 
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of 44 pages of digitized official correspondence organized in a chronological order.2 
The American Legation library in Tangier also holds a file that contains several 
records relating to FDR’s visit to Morocco including a four-page typed report on 
the events of January 22, 1943, drawn from the notes of Harry Hopkins, FDR’s 
close advisor. There is also an excerpt from a log kept during the president’s trip to 
Casablanca providing significant details on the visit. 
It can be gleaned from these documents that contact between FDR and the 
sultan began in November 1942 after the landing of U.S. troops on the Atlantic 
coast of Morocco. The purport of this early correspondence bears upon the 
immediate war affairs and the long tradition of friendship and respect that united 
Morocco and U.S.3 Other documents offer substantial information on the dinner 
meeting on January 22. The sultan, it is stated, arrived at the villa Dar Essaada at 
7:40 p.m. accompanied by the Crown Prince, the Grand Vizier, and Chief of 
Protocol. They “were magnificently attired in white silk robes and came bearing 
several presents – a gold-mounted dagger for the President in a beautiful inlaid 
teakwood case, and two golden bracelets and a high golden tiara for Mrs. 
Roosevelt” (Hopkins, 1943, p. 531). The presents were duly acknowledged by Mrs. 
Roosevelt in a subsequent letter to the sultan. The documents say very little about 
the exchange between the sultan and FDR save that the sultan and his delegation 
departed at 10:10 p.m. and were followed by Prime Minister Churchill, General 
Nogues, the Resident General, and General Patton. De Gaulle was not invited to the 
dinner but was received by FDR alone shortly afterwards. 
The following day, still motivated by the encouraging words of the president, 
the sultan dispatched his Grand Vizier and Chief of Protocol to meet Hopkins. The 
minutes of the secret meeting recorded by Brigadier General Wilbur reveal that the 
sultan was curious to know American plans for the future of Morocco and 
particularly Roosevelt’s position regarding a tentative proposal of an eventual U.S. 
takeover of the French and Spanish protectorate mandates. Hopkins’s response was 
diplomatic and evasive.4 His reserved reaction would set a pattern of U.S. political 
conduct in subsequent years. A number of American historians (Sangmuah, 1992, 
p. 132; Stenner, 2014, p. 526) have characterized the persistent attempts of the 
Sultan and the nationalists to elicit from U.S. consuls clear statements as well as 
concrete action in support of the Moroccan cause as acts of nuisance and 
manipulation resulting in a great deal of embarrassment for the U.S. administration. 
In contrast, the sultan’s overtures show the great confidence he placed in 
 
2 “Morocco: Diplomatic Correspondence, 1933-1945, FDR-FDRPSF.” Retrieved from 
https://catalog.archives.gov/id/16618683 
3 The sultan’s letter in Arabic (dated 12 Dhul-Qa`dah 1361/ November 21, 1942) is a 
response to both a letter and telegram sent by FDR. The French and English translations of 
the Arabic version carry an earlier date, which is obviously a mistake. There is also copy of 
FDR’s letter to the sultan carrying no date or signature. The heading at the top indicates 
that the version was intended for the press and bears a later date (1942, November 23). 
Judging from its contents, the letter may be the original one sent to the sultan 
acknowledged in his response.  
4 Wilbur Notes. (1943). Retrieved from 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1941-43/d382 
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Roosevelt’s power to redefine the rules of the game and to enforce a new process 
of political change. Above all, they reflect his loss of faith in the ability of the 
Franco-Spanish protectorate systems to serve the interests of the Moroccans.  
Not discouraged by Hopkins’ circumspect attitude, and wishing to take 
advantage of the opportune political conjuncture, the sultan instructed Thami El 
Glaoui, then still a close and trusted advisor, to open channels of communication 
with the British and American Consuls with the aim of probing their views 
regarding the proposition, of establishing a “joint protection” with France over 
Morocco. To get around French control of the foreign policy decision-making 
imposed by the terms of the treaty, the sultan also solicited the “appointment of 
diplomatic representatives who would have direct access to him” (Hull, 1943, p. 
738). The instructions of the Department of State to the U.S. consul in Casablanca 
echoed the same views expressed by their British counterparts namely that “it would 
be both impracticable and impolitic to support any such policies or ambitions as 
ascribed to the Sultan” (Hull, 1943, p. 739).  
Secretary of State Cordell Hull was the principal architect of the policy of non-
interference in French domestic affairs in Morocco. When he reported on his 
meeting with the sultan in Oujda on June 24, 1943, Robert D. Murphy, Roosevelt’s 
special representative in North Africa, was aware of the policy line adopted by the 
State Department. He observed, “I have been careful to avoid several suggestions 
emanating from Rabat for a ‘confidential’ discussion with the Sultan, as I feel that 
this is a matter in which the Department would desire the greatest prudence 
exercised” (Murphy, 1943, p. 743). On the other hand, Hull was concerned about 
the repressive measures taken by the French colonial authorities against North 
African populations. He accordingly directed U.S. consuls to report on the conduct 
of French administration and signify to French officials that Americans “have a 
natural interest in the native situation in French North Africa, [...] and that this 
interest may be expected to increase in the future” (Stettinius, 1943, p. 746). 
The reserved response of U.S. diplomatic agents did not dissuade the sultan or 
the nationalists from continuing their campaign. On the morning of January 11, 
1944, two nationalist leaders, Mohamed Lyazidi and Idriss Mhamedi (who later 
became Minister of Interior in the first cabinet of independent Morocco), paid a 
visit to the American consulate in Rabat and were received by the vice consul, 
Donald A. Dumont. The purpose of their visit was to submit a copy of the 
Independence Manifesto and, interestingly enough, a letter intended for President 
Roosevelt. The vice consul, who had no clear instructions as how to deal with such 
a situation, could only point out “the impropriety of transmitting communications 
from political groups in a foreign country to the President of the United States” 
(Dumont, 1944, para 4). 
The letter, of which a copy is preserved at the Tangier American Legation 
library, reveals the nationalists’ high hopes in the American administration and 
especially the president. Addressing President Roosevelt, the signatories stated that,  
Knowing your high sense of justice and your great love of liberty, we are 
convinced that our movement will find benevolent sympathy not only near 
Your Excellency, but also with your government and the great American 
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democracy ... You did us the signal honor of coming to our country and 
you encouraged U.S. thereby to continue the struggle by the side of the 
Allies, for our freedom, the Liberation of France and the Triumph of the 
humanitarian principles for which the Allies are making so many sacrifices. 
(Abdeljalil, Belafrej, Zeghari, Bahim & Chami, 1944, para 2). 
 
Of particular interest here is the report of U.S. Consul General Frederick Mayer to 
the State Department dated January 12, 1944. Mayer expressed strong disinclination 
to encourage the nationalists’ activities and even pressed for a firm statement from 
his government to this effect:  
 
If Department wants to nip in bud this movement before it could reach 
serious proportions, I respectfully suggest desirability of official 
pronouncement to the effect that American Government cannot look with 
favor upon political movements in areas associated in war effort which 
might hamper progress of war. (Mayer, 1944, p. 532) 
 
U.S. records show that this particular letter with its edgy tone caught Roosevelt’s 
attention, and he desired to see the State Department’s response before it was 
dispatched. Despite the escalation of events and the arrest of nationalist members 
by French authorities reported by Mayer in the following weeks, the State 
Department’s letter, dated January 31 and approved by FDR, expressed mild 
concern. It called for restraint and advised, “the Sultan and the nationalist groups to 
avoid challenging the authority of the French and thereby undermining the security 
of the zone at this time” (Hull, 1944, p. 537). Mayer’s pleas for a clear U.S. policy 
regarding the surging political activities of the nationalists warranted a discreet hint 
that the State Department took into account “what appears to be a sympathetic 
interest in the native problem of Morocco in the highest quarters” (Murray, 1944, 
p. 537). 
FDR gave further evidence of his political sentiment when he decided to send 
his autographed photograph to Pasha Glaoui later in January. Secretary Hull 
signified that given the explosive political situation in Morocco, “it might be 
advisable to defer this presentation until such time as the agitation has calmed 
down” (Hull, 1944, P.36). FDR replied in a later memo that he did not see how his 
photograph could “change the future of history,” and prophesied that “in regard to 
Morocco something new is bound to happen in the next ten years, I do not think 
that a population, which is ninety per cent Moors, should be run permanently by 
France” (Roosevelt, 1944, p. 35). 
 
Post-War American Policies vis-a-vis the Moroccan Question 
What was the sultan’s role in this whole process? How much support was he 
willing to give to the nationalist movement in particular in the light of the many 
constraints imposed on him by the terms of the Protectorate treaty and the repressive 
policies of the General Residency? Until then, the margin of maneuver available to 
him was limited and discrete action seemed an advisable strategy to avert open 
French reprisal. The nationalists’ move in January 1944, however, could not have 
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been undertaken without the tacit approval of the Sultan. The published memoirs of 
some of these nationalists underline the fact that nationalist activities were planned 
in concert with the sultan and his close circle (Al-Wazzānī, 1986, pp. 97-102; 
Qādirī, 1997; pp. 174-175). Al-Wazzānī notes in his memoir that on January 13, 
1944 following the presentation of the Independence manifesto, the sultan 
summoned the Pashas and requested their opinions on the nationalists’ demands. 
All but the Pasha of Fes supported the call for independence (Al-Wazzānī, 1982, p. 
97). 
The death of FDR in April 1945 and the victory of the Allies in the war gave a 
real boost to the French colonial authorities to crack down on the burgeoning 
independence movement and its representative entity—the Istiqlal Party. While the 
Truman administration did not display any interest in supporting Moroccan 
nationalists and undermining French interests, U.S. consuls were not blind to the 
fast deteriorating situation in North Africa and the rising wave of nationalism across 
the region. In the broad geo-political context of the post-war and the settling of the 
Cold War era, Morocco’s strategic importance diminished significantly. The 
Department of State records related to Morocco in the post-war years focus on U.S. 
efforts to restore the international status of Tangier and end Spanish control over 
the city. Thus, in August 1945, delegations from France, Britain, the Soviet Union, 
and the United States held several meetings in Paris and agreed to a new and 
provisional regime for Tangier that guaranteed the international character of the city 
and the rights of powers signatories of the 1923 statute. Given American political 
ascendancy at the international scene, France and Britain invited the United States 
to take part in the administration of the city. In his response to the French 
ambassador in Washington, the acting secretary of state stipulated that American 
participation in the administration of Tangier shall not cause any modification or 
prejudice to the rights and privileges acquired by the United States and enjoyed by 
its nationals and ressortissants prior to the introduction of Tangier Statute in 1923.5 
Over the next years, the refusal of the U.S. administration to recognize the specific 
terms of the French Protectorate treaty relating to U.S. extra-territorial privileges 
ensured by the old treaties of 1786 and 1836 with Morocco proved to be a point of 
contention (Azzou, 2005, pp. 110-111). It triggered a long legal dispute with France 
that reached the International Court of Justice in 1950. The case was eventually 
ruled in favor of the French government in August 1952.6  
The sultan, on his part, saw in the restitution of the international status of 
Tangier an opportunity to assert his sovereignty and bring international attention to 
the political crisis in Morocco. In an era marked by anti-colonial struggle and the 
 
5 Acheson D. (1945, September 22). The Acting Secretary of State to the French Ambassador 
(Bonnet). Retrieved from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d6446 
Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of The United States of America in Morocco (France 
V. United States of America) (1952, August 27). Retrieved from https://www.icj-
cij.org/files/case-related/11/011-19520827-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf 
6 Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of The United States of America in Morocco (France 
V. United States of America) (1952, August 27). Retrieved from https://www.icj-
cij.org/files/case-related/11/011-19520827-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf 
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surge of nationalist movements, political groups and organizations across North 
Africa succeeded in establishing contact and securing support from the newly 
created Arab League in Cairo and from its first Secretary General Abderahman 
Azzam Basha. The declared attachment of Morocco’s political elite to their Arab 
and Islamic roots undermined France’s influence and the policies it endeavored to 
pursue in Morocco. The sultan’s visit to Tangier in April 1947 was inscribed within 
this new post-war dynamic. Though long envisaged, it came at a propitious time 
and added new momentum to the active agenda of the nationalists. 
The details of this visit were recorded by the historian Abdellah Al-Jirārī, who 
served in several capacities in the Royal Court in the 1940s, and the nationalist 
leader Allal Al- Fāsī. In his memoir of Sultan Mohamed V, Al-Jirārī notes that the 
Tangier journey, which lasted from Wednesday, April 9 to Sunday April, 13, was a 
historic event that further demonstrated the unanimous support and loyalty enjoyed 
by the sultan in the Spanish and international zone of his kingdom. Arriving in 
Tangier by train from Rabat after a ceremonious stopover in Asila, the sultan was 
driven to the palace of the Mendoub amid large crowds of cheering bystanders 
raising colorful banners. In the evening, the municipality organized a show of 
fireworks in celebration of the event. The following day, Thursday April 10, he 
received in his Palace at Mendoubiya, representatives of foreign powers, as well as 
dignitaries from the Muslim and Jewish communities. The first of these diplomatic 
officials was the American Consul General in Tangier, Paul H. Alling who had just 
been nominated U.S. ambassador to Syria. The Sultan then received the 
representatives of Great Britain, Spain, and France, successively, and made the 
following statement: 
 
In this informal meeting, and in the presence of representatives of the 
friendly countries, we are pleased to extend our sincere thanks to you for 
the affection you have shown us and to the Moroccan people on this 
historic occasion, this is not surprising, since the bonds of affection we 
have had since ancient times were built by our noble ancestors. …You are 
well acquainted that Morocco participated in the last war and contributed 
its sons and all its means until the final victory was achieved, and since 
nations are now demanding rights that suit the present time, it is only right 
for the Moroccan people to obtain their legitimate rights and to achieve 
what we hope for and what the Moroccan people yearns to like all other 
nations. (Al-Jirārī & Jawharī, 2006, p. 131). 
 
After this reception, the sultan delivered a long and powerful speech to the public 
that went down in the annals of history as the speech that launched the sultan’s 
formal public engagement to reverse the status quo. The speech laid emphasis on 
the Islamic identity of the Moroccan nation and its strong ties with the Arab 
countries through their newly established entity the Arab League. It also called 
attention to the strong bonds that had united the royal family with the Moroccan 
people and made repeated references to the necessity for the Moroccan people to 
attain their legitimate rights. More significantly, the speech made no ceremonious 
reference to the work of the French colonial authorities, and the omission was 
Karim Bejjit   43 
 
 
interpreted as the sultan’s new disposition to resist the imposed policies of the 
residency. George Joffé argues that the Tangier speech not only revealed the 
sultan’s endorsement of the nationalist agenda, but also paved the way for the 
urban-based Istiqlal party to spread its influence in the rural parts of the country 
where it lacked grassroots base (Joffé, 1985, pp. 289-290).  
The escalating events that followed in the ensuing years and the French 
hardline policy to curb the sultan’s ascendant influence and popularity among the 
Moroccan population and its political elite only served to radicalize his position vis-
a-vis the French colonial establishment. Beside infusing local domestic public 
enthusiasm and confirming his sovereignty over the northern region of the country, 
which had been under Spanish control since 1912, the sultan’s visit to Tangier 
enabled him to reach out to the international community through its diplomatic 
agents represented in Tangier and to receive extensive media coverage both in local 
and foreign newspapers. If during the Anfa conference the sultan emerged as a head 
of State struggling to secure American recognition and support for his country’s 
cause, the Tangier visit acclaimed him as a popular and legitimate sovereign who 
inspired hope and confidence among his people in the future. On Friday, the sultan 
headed to the great mosque of Tangier and delivered the Khutba (sermon) to the 
excited worshippers. While his sermon did not contain any clear political messages 
apart from exhortations to hold to the teachings of Islam, it endorsed his image as a 
devout and religious leader.  
The outcome of this extraordinary royal visit to Tangier for the colonial 
authorities in Rabat and the Parisian official circles was extremely disappointing. 
By appointing Resident General Eric Labonne in early 1946, French government 
had aimed to appease the tense political situation in Morocco and introduce new 
reforms commensurate with rising demands of nationalist movements across North 
Africa. However, Labonne’s agricultural and educational reform policies as well as 
political reconciliation failed to contain the demands of the nationalists for a 
political process culminating in Moroccan independence. The apparently lenient 
policy and bill of reforms of Labonne did not appeal to the French colonists either. 
The tragic incident of the ben M’sik massacre of April 7, 1947 on the eve of the 
sultan’s visit to Tangier, reported in international newspapers including the New 
York Times, had raised tensions further. Labonne was succeeded by General 
Alphonse Juin, a military figure of a less tractable nature whose term would see the 
further deterioration of relations with the sultan and the nationalists.  
How did the American authorities react to these changes in Morocco? 
Contemporary U.S. diplomatic correspondence reveals that the situation in the 
country was being watched carefully. The situation of North Africa was far from 
reassuring and the policies adopted in Paris and implemented by the colonial 
authorities in Tunis, Algiers, and Rabat did not seem to meet the rising demands of 
North African peoples whose agitations for better political and social conditions 
were now strongly supported by the Arab League. A new agency, the Bureau du 
Moghreb Arabe, was established in Cairo, which brought together the major 
political parties in the three countries. In July 1947 by instructions from the 
nationalist movement and the approval of the sultan, Mahdi Bennouna travelled to 
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New York and established an office to lobby for the Moroccan cause among the 
members of United Nations (Perkins, 1976, p. 66). The fruit of his efforts and of his 
office will begin to show only in the early 1950s when the Moroccan case was 
debated in the UN General Assembly sessions. 
Meanwhile in light of the activities of French communists in France and 
Morocco American officials in Morocco began to sound the alarm, and frequently 
advised the Department of State in Washington that although the nationalists had 
expressed allegiance to the United States, they may in desperate measures resort to 
Soviet political support in the United Nations or even clandestinely to bring the 
desired change in their country. What used to be an exclusively French colonial 
affair had now become a delicate issue for American government. The currents of 
Cold War politics, it seems, had swept over this part of the world too. The American 
government was unwilling to allow Soviet influence to penetrate this strategic area. 
On June 10, 1947, only two months after the sultan’s visit to Tangier, Secretary 
of State George Marshall wrote to the U.S. embassy in Paris outlining his view of 
the North African situation. He noted that to avert the risk of the Indo-China 
scenario, the solution lies in “leading North Africans [being] approached with some 
plan guaranteeing evolution toward self-government while concurrently 
safeguarding economic development of country and legitimate French interests in 
area by integration into French Union” (Marshall, 1948, p. 686). He urged the 
ambassador to summon U.S. agents in North Africa to confer on the situation there 
and propose a course of action. The conference indeed took place a week later in 
the American embassy in Paris and was attended by representatives of U.S. 
missions in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and France. The report of their 
findings presented by Ambassador Jefferson Caffery was detailed and contained a 
road map to resolve the crisis that was fast developing in North Africa. After 
outlining U.S. principles and orientations in taking this initiative, the participants 
including Paul H. Alling the Consul-General of Tangier who chaired the meeting, 
proposed that the French government be approached and urged to introduce “long-
range plans to guide both North African Protectorates (Morocco and Tunisia) 
toward dominion status” (Caffery, 1947, p. 693). Such a plan, they pointed out, 
should have a definite time-frame and should involve concrete actions to establish 
“without delay a solid basis of mutual trust” (Caffery, 1947, p. 693). These actions 
include “freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, rapid amplification of the 
school program, administrative reforms, initiation to democratic ways through 
municipal elections, etc.” (Caffery, 1947, p. 693). 
In retrospect, these proposed reforms received little heeding from the French 
authorities who preferred to pursue a stick policy in their North African colonies. 
The American government on its part continued to ignore the nationalists’ appeals 
for support, and often used its political influence to offset the criticism and 
condemnation of France in the United Nations. The raging Indochina war and 
French grim prospects there compelled the U.S. government to support French 
economically, militarily, and politically. The establishment of U.S. air bases in 
Morocco in 1951 without prior consultation or consent of the sultan were part of 
the broad framework of their collaboration. However, starting from 1953 after the 
French had deposed Sultan Mohamed Ben Youssef, the U.S. government was itself 
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under pressure from Arab and Asian countries to take a firm position against France 
in the United Nations general Assembly. In the end, France had to reverse its 
colonial policy and acquiesce to the demands of the nationalist movement by 
reinstating the sultan and bringing to end the long protectorate phase. 
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